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LA KE ELECTRIC ASSOCI-




BRIEF OF APPELLANT SCOTT BRIGHAM, 
by FRANK E. BRIGHAM, GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
On June 28, 1968, Frank E. Brigham and three of 
his sons, :Jiichael, Steven and Scott, along with Stephen 
Croft, a neighbor boy, left Salt Lake on a camping trip. 
The purpose of their expedition was to search for ar-
rowl10ads. rrhey spent the night at a campsite east of 
Hoosenlt near Fort Duchesne in Uintah County. The 
1wxt morning they arose, ate breakfast and began their 
They spread out, leaving some distance between 
l'nch person, so as to co\·er a larger area of ground, 
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and climbed a small mesa m the neighborhood of the 
campsite. (Tr. 12-18). 
A power pole, located on top of the mesn, carrying 
Moon Lake's transmission lines had rotted, broken and 
fallen to the ground. The power lines lay on or near 
ground level. As he approached the downed lines, 
::\Iiehael, a boy of about 15, noticed two wires, both 
rather taut and not very far off the ground. As he 
stopped to go under the wires, he bumped into one of 
the lines with his forehead (Tr. 242). Scott, then about 
age 10, asked his brother if the wires were live (Tr. 242). 
According to defendant's e\'idence, Michael answered to 
the effect that the wires did not contain any electricity 
(Tr. 242). As he ducked to go under the wires, Scott 
came in contact with a liYe wire from which he received 
an electrical shock, causing hums and rendering him life-
less. (Tr. 136). He was saYed only thr'.Jugh the expedi-
tious application of artificial respiration by his father 
(Tr. 19-21). Immediately thereafter, Scott was rushed 
to the hospital in Roosevelt, where he was treated and 
released (Tr. 23). As a result of his contact with the 
electric power line, Scott received severe, though local-
ized, burns requiring extensive treatment, including 
rather delicate skin grafting operations (Tr. 138-145, 
160). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was submitted to the jury on interroga-
tories which were answered as follows: 
"We, the jury, find the following answers 
to questions put to us: 
2 
1. '.Vere the employees and agents of the de-
fr11clanL Moon Lake Electric Association negli-
gent in maintaining the electric transmission 
Yes 
(yes or no) 
2. If your answer to question No. 1 is 'yes', 
then answer the following question: 
\Vas such negligence a proximate cause of 
the injury to the plaintiff Scott 
Yes 
(yes or no) 
3. \Vas the plaintiff Scott Brigham negli-
gent in coming in to contact with the electric 
transmission line? Yes 
(yes or no) 
4. If your answer to question No. 3 is 'yes', 
then answer the following question: 
\Vas such negligence a proximate cause of 
the injury to the plaintiff Scott 
:_'"es 
(yes or no) 
5. vVhat sum of money would compensate 
plaintiffs for special $736.80 
6. What sum of money would reasonably 
compensate plaintiff Scott Brigham for general 
damages? $2,500.00" (Tr. 161). 
A judgment of no cause of action was entered 
against plaintiff based upon the finding of contributory 
negligence. This appeal is prosecuted from that judg-
ment. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT O"N" APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment entered 
by the trial court and remand for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROP-
ERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO 
THE EXTENT OF DEFENDANT'S LIA-
BILITY. 
(a) The co1Tect rule is strict liability in situations like 
that presented in the present case. 
The court at trial instructed the jury that the de-
fendant should only he liable if clefendr-nt ·was negligent 
;n allowing the power pole to rot an<l fall. Plaintiff sub-
mitted a re(1uected instruction (R. 123), which was de-
nied, asserting that utility companies should be strictly 
liable when, because of defects exclusi\·cly under their 
control, injuries occur and losses result. A1)pellant sub-
mits that the rule of law contained in the rejected in-
struction is the rule imposed hy the statutes of Utah, 
that it is the better rule, that this Court should so rule, 
and that the case should be remand0cl with instructions 
that the defendant in this rase is strictly liable for all 
injuries resulting from the (lrfrcti\·e pole nrnl trans-
mission line. 
Srdion 3-1-7-22 of the lTtah Code ..:\nnotated (Rep. 
vol. 195;3) states: 
'' (1) In case any pnhlic utility shall clo or 
cause or permit to he clone any ad, mntter or 
thing prohibited, forbicldrn or declared to he u11-
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lawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter or 
thing rey_uired to be done, either by the Constitu-
tion or any law of this State or by any order or 
decision of the commission, such public utility 
shall be liable to the persons affected thereby for 
all loss, damages or injury caused thereby or re-
sulting therefrom, and if the court shall find that 
the act or ommission was wilful, the court shall, 
in addition to the actual damages, award exem-
plary damages. An action to recover for such 
loss, damage or injury may be brought in any 
court of competent jurisdiction by any person. 
(2) No recoYery as in this section provided 
shall in any manner affect a recovery by the 
state of the penalties in this title provided." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Public Service Commission, the regulatory 
l)otl:· oYerset•ing the operation of power companies, has 
adopted h:· Order No. 54 with Supplemental Order No. 
2 on the 26th of 1f arch, 1963, Safety Rules for the 
fostallation and :\f aintenance of Electric Supply and 
Communieatiou Lines, Handbook 81, (1961) as published 
h:· the U. 8. Department of Commerce, National Bureau 
of Sta11clards. Section 213 (A) (2) (Page 44) of Hand-
hook 81 states: 
''Lines and equipme11t shall be systematically in-
S JJecf ed from time to time by the person responsi-
ble for th0 installation." (Emphasis added.) 
The record clearly shows that defendants had no 
s,11ste111otic progrmn for inspecting their power lines (Tr. 
(i4, 8±). Oecasicmally an airplane would fly over the 
power lin0s to see if any power poles were down (Tr. 
8.i-87). The flights were usually made only after wind-
;) 
storms, heaYy snow storms, dcC'r season or similar oc-
currences when the power company might expect to have 
problems with th0ir power lines. Exrept for a Yisual 
inspection after a pole had been r0moved, the c:ompa11y 
made no inspection of the pol0s themselves to see if they 
were sound and fit. Pole removal, of course, 'Was carried 
out on a Yery irregular and intermittent basis. For poles 
that were left in the ground, there was no actual program 
of regular inspection (Tr. 83-88). 
Such sporadic and ineffective inspection as was con-
ducted hy defendant does not meet the requirement that 
lines shall be "systematically inspected from time to 
time." Bera use Section 54-7-22 imposes liability, irre-
specfr1;e of negligence or fault, for any Yiolations of the 
rules prescribed by the Commission, strict liability is 
the rule to be imposed upon a defendant for failure to 
follow the rules prescribed by the Commission. 
The strength of the public policy embodied in Utah 
Code Annota tecl 54-7-22 is reinforced and re-emphasiz-
ed by § 54-7-25 U.C.A. (Rep. ,·ol. 1933) This section 
provides in part : 
"(1) Any public utility which Yiolates or 
fails to comply with any provisioll of the Consti-
tution of this State or cf this title, or whiC'h fails, 
omits or neglects to obey, obsen·e or comply with 
any order, decision, decree, rnle, direction, de-
mand or requirement, or any part or provision 
thereof, of the commissio11, in a case in which 
a penalty has not herein before been pro,·idc<l for 
such public utility, is suliject to a penalty of not 
less than five hurnlre<l nor more than two thou-
sand dollars for each a11d cv0n· offcns0. 
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"(S) Every violation of the r>rov1s1011s of 
this title or of any order, decision decree rule . ' ' ' directicn, demand or requirement, or any part or 
provision thereof, of the commission, by any cor-
pora ti on or person is a separate and distinct of-
fense, and, in case of a continuing violation, each 
day's continuance thereof shall be a separate and 
distinct offense.'' 
This statute imposes criminal penalties to the same ex-
tent c\ 54-7-22 imposes civil liabilities. The legislature 
has clearly indicated in two separate statutes that power 
companies shall follow the orders of the Public Service 
Commission; otherwise, they shall pay for their dere-
lictions. r:rhe imposition of strict liability would not be 
radical and unjustified judicial legislation; on the con-
trary, such strict liability is the policy and the law of 
the State of Utah. 
( b) Even if strict liability were not the rule imposed 
by statutej strict liability should be the rule imposed in a 
ca.;,e like the present one. 
Traditionally the courts have applied a very strin-
g0nt and exacting negligence standard to describe the 
duty owed by power companies to those who might come 
in contact with high power lines. The courts have recog-
nized that such a standard is only commensurate with the 
Yery grave risks of injury and death inherent in any 
iHstalla ti on transporting large amounts of electricity. 
rrhe case of Cornucopia Gold 1lfines v. Locken, 150 F.2d 
73 (0th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 763 (1945) presented 
a fact situation very similar to the instant case. In 
Locken, plaintiff's decedent, a young woman, had wan-
dered off a dirt road, had become entagled with sagging 
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fransmission lines, which were dangerously near the 
ground, and was electrocuted. The evidence showed that 
the defendant had made very irregular inspections of 
the power lines. As to the defendant's duty to those who 
might become entangled within these power lines, the 
court stated: 
"\Ve con cl nde that where as in this case the 
owner of such a. transmission line wire negli-
gently fails to inspect and repair it and allows 
it to become in disrepair and sag near and rest 
upon brush on the ground in wild unfenced 
mountainous mining country, so that one leaving 
a nearby road and walking near or over such 
transmission line would likely come in contact 
it and therehy be injnred, is guilty of wreck-
less conduct and wanton negligence rendering the 
owner liable for resulting personal lllJury, 
ichetlier or not the one injured 1cas a technical or 
other kind of trespasser." (130 F.2d 77) (Em-
phasis added). 
In Locken the court avoided def enclant 's defenses by 
calling defendant's conduct ''wanton negligence.'' The 
court appeared to say that since defendant's conduct 
was so had, he should not he able to shield himself with 
flimsy defenses. This is precisely the situation in the 
present case. 
Though apparently never presented "-ith facts 
squarely in point 'Sith the present case, the Utnh Sn-
IH'eme Court has stated that power companies do ha,-c n 
very high tluty of care indeed. In the case of Toma t. 
Utah Power & Light Company, 12 Utah 2cl 278, 363 P.2cl 
788, ( 1961), the Court stated: 
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''The cldendant in this case was engaged as a 
public utility furnishing electric power to a large 
number of customers. It was furnished various 
persons under different and peculiar circum-
stances. In all cases it is required to exercise the 
degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence 
would under the circumstances. It is well known 
that one dealing with electricity deals with a 
force of dangerous character and that there is a 
constant risk of injury to persons or property if 
not properly controlled. The care observed must 
1w commensurate with and proportionate to the 
clanger. Therefore, the defendant company was 
obliged to meet a high standard of care, which 
was g-reater in some cases than another depending 
on the exigency of the service rendered.'' 
The courts have imposed upon those dealing in electricity 
a much higher standard of care than would be applied to 
those dealing in less dangerous articles. The law has 
rightly recognized that sound policy demands that power 
companies faithfully follow exacting and rigid safety 
requirements. 
The general theory of tort liability seeks some way 
to divide losses. The negligence standard, conveying as 
it does some implication of fault, is a somewhat arbitrary 
but practical method of distributing losses where the 
law could not decide, without the presence of such a 
standard, ·where the losses should fall. In the vast major-
ity of cases involving accidents and the need to distribute 
losses, the negligence standard makes sense. Unless one 
has some stronger reason for allocating the cost of ac-
cidents to one party or the other, fault seems to be a way 
to make such an allocation without being unduly ar-
9 
bitrary. Through the use of the doctrine of contributory 
negligence, the law has taken the position, though by no 
rn0ans without doubts, that if both parties are at fault, 
then there is no real reason to impose liability on one 
party and thus distribute the loss. 
HoweYer, when there are reasons for allocating the 
damages for injuries to one party or the other, irrespec-
tiYe of fault, then the rationale for the negligence stan-
dard no longer has much persuasi\'eness. \Vhen it is 
0asy to decide where liability should lie, there is 110 need 
to resort to rules, which may be imperfect and question-
abl0, to distribute those losses. Indisputably the cost of 
maintaining safe electrical transmission systems, por-
tending nri threat to human life, belongs upon po\Yer 
companies. Power companies should recognize and be 
responsible for the maintenance of the highest safety 
standards, and the law should not allow any deYiations 
from the highest standards. Not to place these costs of 
safe transmission lines on the power companies is to 
allow them to avoid their normal costs of doing business. 
See Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Lan· of Turts, 72 
Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1959). 
The rule of negligence liability, when applied to 
cases such as the present one, gives to the power com-
pany a macabre decision. The power company can esti-
mate what its costs due to liability lawsuits will he if 
it does not maintain proper safety standards. It can then 
balance those costs against the costs inYolved in main-
taining rigidly controlled and inspected transmission 
lines. It may decide, however wrongly, that it is cheaper 
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to run the risk of liability lawsuit than to provide the 
kind of safety standards which will reasonably and 
adequately protect human life and prevent injury. The 
law should not allow power companies to make this 
choice. Sound public policy would dictate that the power 
recognize their responsibility to maintain the 
highest safety standards; the law should not leave them 
the option of gambling that they can reduce their legiti-
mate costs because of the reluctance of jurors to grant 
<:nrnrds or the unwillingness of parties to risk lawsuits. 
The theory being advanced here, that damages for 
injurie:s resulting from defective installations are a cost 
of doing business, is neither novel nor revolutionary. The 
law has in several areas recognized the need for the im-
position of strict liability. There are two areas of strict 
tort liability which have particular relevance for the 
cnse at bar: the ultrahazardous activities doctrine, which 
should apply to transmission of electricity, and the 
products liability area, which offers sound and per-
suasive policy reasons for imposing liability on the de-
fendant in the case at bar. 
The doctrine that one who engages in ultrahazar-
dons activities does so at his peril has been recognized 
in Utah. In the case of 111 ad sen v. East Jordan Irrigation 
Company, 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794, 795 (1942), the 
Court stated: 
"It is conceded that the rule of absolute liability 
prevails when one uses explosives and the blast-
ing of said explosives results in hurling of rock, 
earth or debris which causes injury to another." 
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Robison r. Robi.'-011, 16 Utah 2d 2-12, :394 P.2d 876, 877 
(1964), another ease dealing with explosives, recognized 
the rule: 
" [ 0] ne who uses or is responsible for a danger-
ous instrumentality is absolutely liable for any 
resulting damage.'' 
In the case of Southwick v S. S. Mullen, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 
430, 432 P.2cl 56 (1967), the Court restated its commit-
ment to the rule of absolute or strict liability in blasting 
cases. The theory behind strict liability in the dangerous 
instrumentalit:v area is quite simple. The risks of injury 
and the potential threat to human life are so great that 
the• party who is performing the dangerous act should 
pay for all resultant damages and injuries. HaYing to 
pay for all resulting costs also compels those engaging 
in ultrahazarclous activities to maintain the very strict-
est and highest safety standards. The law here is recog-
nizing a "felt necesity" and insuring that the powers 
of the law will be used to enforce desirable social policy. 
Electricity is obviously a yery dangerous instrumen-
tality. This is espeeially true ·when it is being carried 
through high voltage transmission lines. As was pointed 
out at trial by l\f r. E. Ballard of the Lake Electric 
Associati011, it is Yery difficult, if not impossible to pro-
teet human lifo when people come> into contact with high 
Yoltage lin0s. Mr. Ballanl \\·as asked what protection to 
human life was actually built into the distribution system. 
His answer is significant: 
"Protection to human life that is built into the 
system is the aetual starnlanl of construetion 
ml'aJlS the meehaniC'al of the poles 
J2 
and the elevation of the conductor above the 
ground and the separation, in other words, from 
ground and the ability of a person to come into 
contact with a conductor which becomes a physical 
thing in the construction." (Tr. 88). 
Though not stated with imposing elegance, Mr. Ballard's 
point is well taken. The only way life can be protected 
"'hen high power lines are involved is to keep the high 
power lines away from human beings. If the high power 
lines do come close to human activities, then the risks 
of injury and possible death become intolerably great; 
the duty rests upon the power company to insure that 
the power lines never come that close to the ground. 
A second area where the principle of strict liability 
has been increasingly recognized is the products liability 
area. In his famous concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944), Mr. 
Justice Traynor outlined the theoretical bases for strict 
liability upon the manufacturer of defective consumer 
goods: 
'' if there is no negligence, however, public 
policy demands that responsibility be fixed where-
ever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to 
life and health inherent in defective products that 
reach the market. It is evident that the manufac-
turer can rtnticipate some hazards and guard 
against the recurrence of others, as the public 
cannot. Those ·who suffer injury from defective 
products are unprepared to meet its 
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or 
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the 
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk 
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer 
clistrihukd among the public as a cost of domg 
business. It is to the public interest to discourage 
the marketing of products having defects that are 
a menace to the public. If such products neverthe-
less find their way into the market, it is to the 
public interest to place the responsibility for 
whatever injury they may cause upon the manu-
facturer, who, eYen if he is not negligent in the 
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its 
reaching the market. However intermittently such 
injuries may occur and howeYer haphazardly they 
may strike, the risk of their occurence is a con-
stant risk and a general one. Against such a risk 
there should be a general and constant protection 
and the mannfacturrr is hest situated to afford 
such protection.'' 
In tbr casr of Greenman 1.:. Yuba Power Products, 
Inc., 377 P.2cl 897, 901(Cal.1962), the policies enunciated 
by Justice Traynor in the Escola case, supra, became 
accepted as ]a''·'· There the court said: 
"rrhe purpose of such linl!ilit;' 18 to insure that 
the costs of injuries resulti11g from Jefective 
products are borne by the manufacturers that put 
such products on the market rather than by the 
injured persons who are powerless to protect 
themselves.'' 
Recently the principle of strict liability for defective 
products has moved relentlessly forward to virtually 
unanimous approval by all courts who haYe been faced 
'Yith the issue. Onr leadi11g case ·which applied the doc-
trine is II e1111ingsr:n c. Bloomfield 111 otors, Inc., 22 N. J. 
338, 161 A.2cl G9G ( 1960), i11Yolving a defective steering 
wheel in an ant0rnobile. ReeO'i'ery was allowed for a (1e-
frctive altimeter in an airplane in the case of Goldberg r. 
K(l!sman !11str111ne11t CorJJ., 12 N.'.-.2<1 4:3:2, l!H N.K2c1 81 
14 
(1963). Srtict liability 'vas held to apply to live virus in 
polio vaecine in Gottcsdanker v. Cutler Laboratories, 6 
Cal. Rep. 320 (Cal. App. 1960). Recovery was allowed for 
a defcctiYe forkstem in Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 
F.2d 911 (5th Cir.1964). 
The products liability area indicates that it is proper 
to place the cost of imperfections in the product on those 
under whose control and inspection the defects are most 
easily found and remedied. Certainly the bottler of the 
defective soft cl rink should remedy the failures of his 
product. His options are: (1) he may throw out the 
clefrch\'e material and replace it with satisfactory mate-
rial, or ( 2) if he chooses to let the defective material 
pass in the market place, then he is responsible for any 
cknrnge proximate1y resulting therefrom. Similarly, if 
a power company allows a defective pole to rot and fall 
to ihe ground, the cost of replacing that pole is clearly 
upon the utility company. It has the choice; it can either 
bear the cost of putting in the new poles and inspecting 
to insure that its poles are in good condition, or it can 
allow the pole to fall and pay for all damages proximate-
ly resulting therefrom. The products liability area also 
helps to giYe a satisfactory workable rule to be applied 
in this case: when, because of defects exclusively under 
the control or supervision of the defendant povver com-
pany, the public comes in contact with the facilities of 
the company and serious or graYe injury results there-
from, strict liability is the standard to he applied. 
In addition, as with the manufacturer in the pro-
clucts liability area, it is the power company who is in 
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the best position to protect against the loss. The utility 
can, by procuring proper insurance, spread the loss 
throughout the general consuming public. For a minimal 
increase in the monthly electric bill, the losses which 
severely fall upon those \Vho are injured can be com-
pensated very cheaply and almost without notice by the 
general consuming public. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts 
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L. J. 
499 (1961). 
In other areas the law has recognized that there are 
certain situations where the duty to pay for damages 
belongs to one party and thus that party should be 
strictly liable. The law of trespass and the law of nui-
sance provide aneient and trenchant examples of strict 
liability. In both of these areas it has long heen held that 
one 1vho invades the property of another is liable for any 
damage8 resulting therefrom, without nuy showing of 
negligence on the pnrt of t1Je defendant. Kinsman v. Utah 
Gas & Coke Company, 53 -Utah 10, 177 Pac. 418 (HHS). 
See Prosser, Torts, 2d Ed., 336, 337; 54 A.L.R. 2d 766. 
Thus, in summary, the normal negligence analysis 
is entirely inappropriate to the case before us. The cost 
of maintaining and inspecting the poles which carry high 
transmission liues is clearly a cost to be borne by the 
power company. If, through the defects in pole or trans-
lines, injury rC'sults, there is 110 need to allocate 
losses. It is clear where the risk of loss belongs; it be-
longs to the pO\\'er company. The lower court should have 
plai11tiff 's requeste>d im;truction 011 strict liahility. 
Failure to do so was fatal error. The jmlg-m0nt should 
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be reversed and the case should be remanded for trial 
on the proper legal theory. 
POINT II. CONTRIBUTORY N E G L I -
GENCE IS NO DEFENSE TO AN ELEC-
TRIC COMP ANY AGAINST WHOM STRICT 
LIABILITY IS BEING IMPOSED. 
Sound policy dictates that when strict liability is 
being imposed, the defendant's potential defenses should 
he severely restricted. Power companies have tradition-
ally been subject to very high standards of care, stan-
clan1s of care which are often in practice indistinguish-
able from strict liability. The substantive difference be-
hYeen strict liability and the traditional negligence stan-
llarcls lies in the fact that the power company should 
110 longer utilize the often flimsy defense of contributory 
negligence. It would make no difference to the power 
company whether its standard of care was negligence or 
strict liability, so long as the power company felt it still 
hac1 the comfortable refuge of local juries largely drawn 
from among its customers and fayorable to its case. To 
make the policy of strict liability effective and meaning-
ful, the power company should not be able to assert the 
clef ense of eontributory negligence. 
In aceordance ·with these policy eonsiderations, the 
general ru1e is that the eontributory negligence of the 
plaiHtiff is not a defense in cases of strict liability; this 
is true at least in those cases where the contributory 
negligence docs not consist of voluntary exposure to a 
known danger. See Prosser, Torts, 2d Ed., page 
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341. The Ctah Supn:_·me Court ha,; held that this is the 
rule applicable in rtah. In Robison L Robison, supra, 
394 P.2d 878, 1i. 8, the rtah Supreme Court said: 
"[T]he kind of contributory negligence that 
would consist of rol wlf a ry r xpos 11 re {o a k 1101cn 
danger, and so amounts to an assumption of risk, 
is ordinarily a defense [to strict liability] ... " 
( Emhasis added.) 
In the case of Ecans r. Stewart, 17 Utah 2d 308, 410 
P.2d 999, 1002 (1966), :\Ir. Justice Crockett had this to 
say about the difference between contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk: 
'' Tliis further should be said in regard to the 
defense ot' assumption of risk. lt is not identical 
with but is closely related to contributory negli-
gence. To im·oke it and preclude recoi-cry there 
must /;e a l·ol1111tary as.'!1u1PJtio11 of the risk of a 
k1101rn da11grr where 011r lias a reasonable oppor-
tunity to make an alternaticc clirjice." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In tllC' case of Jollllscm c. Jlaynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 
342 P .2cl 884:, 886 ( J 959), tl1e distinction between assump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence was delineated 
thusly: 
''Tu gIYmg- tlw fon·going i11structions tlie trial 
court f<'ll i11to the error of confusing the doctrine 
of assumption of risk with contributory negli-
gence. \Yhile in some instances the phrase 'as-
sumption of risk' is used in defining the rights of 
parties where both the plaintiff and defendant are 
charged with negligence, in such situations the 
rig-hts and duties invoh·ed rest upon principles of 
18 
negligence and contributory negligence. The doc-
trine of assumption of risk in many instances 
overlaps into the field of contributory negligence; 
but it must be distinguished and applied only in 
a proper case, that is, when the question involves 
the reasonableness of plaintiff's volunta;ry action 
in the face of a known danger." (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
The approach of these cases has much good sense to 
recommend it. Contributory negligence serves as a some-
what questionable way of distributing losses. In cases of 
strict liability, however, the problem of distributing 
losses is no longer present; the law has already imposed 
liability for losses upon the party who is strictly liable. 
011 the other hand, strong arguments can be made that 
the plaintiff's conduct should be a defense to strict lia-
bility in those cases where the plaintiff's conduct shows 
that he has knoivingly assumed the risk of the danger. 
See Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on 
Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 267. 
In the present case the record is absoluetly void of 
any evidence indicating that the plaintiff, Scott Brigham, 
voluntarily assumed a risk of any knoicn danger. In fact, 
the eYiclence as shown by the record would strain all 
reasonable credibility to show even contributory negli-
g-ence. At the very least, the case should be remanded, 
so that the jury might be instructed to make a proper 
fimliiJO" as to whether or not the plaintiff was in fact 
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assuming the risk of danger that day on the mesa. 
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POINT III. THE EVIDENCE WAS IN-
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A FINDING OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEG LI -
GEN CE. 
(a) D2fendant did not sustain its burden of showing 
plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
The defense of contributory negligence precludes 
any comparison of the negligence of defendant with that 
of plaintiff. If the plaintiff is 5 percent negligent and 
the def cnclant is 9G percent negligent, then, the clef ense 
eliminates any recoYery. This rule often yields harsh 
arn1 unreason a hle results. For this reason defendant 
has the burden of showing that plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent. As it was put in the case of Ray v. Con-
solidated Freight1cays, 4 Utah 2d 137, 289 P.2d 196, 200 
(1955) : 
''At the out sot the mirnl nf the fact trier is pre-
sumably in ea11ipoise 011 tl!e q11estion of whether 
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The 
burden is upon the defendant to orercome this 
balance and to impel his mind toward a conclu-
sion." (Emphasis added.) 
In the present case the defendant did little to dis-
turb the e<Jnipoise tlrnt presumably existed in the mind of 
the jnry. The 0111y significnnt eYidence presented by de-
fendant a8 to piEintiff 's contributory negligence came in 
tlw testimony of 0110 K D.1llarcl, au employee of l\10011 
Lake Electric Association. Balh:rd testified as to the 
substance of a c01ffersation he lrnd with young Scott the 
day of the aeciclen t : 
" ... Scott indicated that he saw his older brother 
pick up a wire and walk under it nml he asked him 
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if it was a hot wire or an electric wire and got an 
answer, 'no', and apparently from the conversa-
tion the next thing he had his hand up against 
the conductor and he indicated to me that he 
reached up and touched the conductor ... " (Tr. 
242) 
Asking his brother about the wires would indicate 
that Scott possessed more than normal foresight and 
concern for a boy of ten. His brother, in answering, was, 
as the record shows, confirming his own experience in 
having brushed one of the wires without adverse con-
sequence. Reasonable men could not assume that boys 
the ages of .Michael and Scott would know that one wire 
carried electricity while the other wire was harmless. 
Sect! prudently reliecl on his older brother's aclvice and 
had no reason to be aware of any threatening danger. 
During cross examination, Scott had trouble re-
membering the exact occurrences of the day of the in-
jury. Counsel for defendant then brought out a copy of 
a deposition of Scott taken some seven months earlier 
(Tr. 19-1). In this deposition Scott stated that "people" 
had told him that he had asked .Michael whether or not 
the wires were live and had been told that Michael either 
dicl not know or that he said they were not. As to details, 
[:lcott \ms very unclear in his own mind, as he could not 
remember an of tlw e\'ents and was only repeating what 
other people had told to him (Deposition of Scott 
Brig-hnm R. 41). The substance of this deposition testi-
mony was not presented to the jury. Only later during 
Ballmcl 's testimony did the jury hear of this conversa-
tion, and then they were to]cl that Scott had askecl 
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Michael whether the wires were li,·e and .Michael had 
told him "no" (Tr. 242). This second version of the con-
versation was the only testimony which defendant offer-
ed to disturb the equipoise in the minds of the triers of 
fact. The evidence, viewed objectively, virtually compels 
the conclusion that Scott was not contributorily negligent. 
Appellant submits that there was no evidence in the rec-
ord upon which the jury could base its finding of con-
tributory negligence, and thus defendant did not sustain 
its lmnlu1 of showing the contributory negligence of 
plaintiff. 
( b) The evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding 
of ccntributory negligence against the plaintiff in the instant 
case. 
The law is somewhat unsettled as to the application 
of the doctrine of contributory negligence to children. 
See 77 A.L.R. 2d 917. Some jurif'dictions apply a pre-
sumption that children between the ages of 7 and 14 are 
not capable of contributory negligence (e.g., Virginia, 
Louisiana, l\Iississippi and others. See 77 A.L.R. 2d 926-
927); however, this presumption is rebuttable by evi-
dence brought fonvard by the defendant to show that 
the child did in fact have such capacity. Most jurisdic-
tinns, incluc1i11g Utah, see Kaicaguchi i·. Be111nett, 112 
Utah 442, 180 r).:2cl 109 (1948), follow the rule that the 
standard of can• to be applietl in a particular case de-
pPnds upon the standard of care reasonably to be ex-
pedecl under the same or similar circumstances from the 
ordinary child of like age, intelligence and experience. 
While this standard seems vag11e and elusive, it does at 
least provide a considerably lower standard of care 
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for children than IS required of normal adults. 
The evidence m this case does not show that 
Scott had any reason to believe that the lines would cause 
him harm. Even if the evidence did so show, defendant's 
own evidence would counter-balance such evidence for at 
the critical time as he approached the wires Scott asked 
if the wires would cause him harm, and was told that 
they would not. It is difficult to see, in view of the state 
of the evidence, how reasonable men could conclude any-
thing but that Scott had acted reasonably and with due 
care and caution for his own safety. The evidence does 
not support a verdict of contributory negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the judgment of the lower 
conrt should be reversed and the case remanded with 
instructions that defendant is strictly liable if plaintiff's 
injuries were in fact ca used by defects in defendant's 
transmission system. Further, instructions should be 
gi,·en that plaintiff's contributory negligence is no de-
fense to the defendant. Finally, appellant suhmits that 
the case should be reyersed because the evidence is in-
sufficient to support the verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
-MULLINER, PRINCE & 
MANGUM 
Gerald R. Miller 
Denis R. Morrill 
Kenneth VT. Yeates 
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